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Abstract: 
In this paper we will argue that many of the ethical problems raised by Ambient Intelligence stems from 
presupposing a behaviourist conception of the relation between human desires and behaviour. Insofar as 
Ambient Intelligence systems take overt, natural behaviour as input, they are likely to suffer from many of 
the same problems that have fuelled the widespread criticism of behaviourist explanations of human behav-
iour. If these limitations of the technology are not sufficiently recognized, the technology is likely to be insuf-
ficiently successful in supporting the needs and desires of human users. We will focus on four distinct chal-
lenges that result from this behaviourist presupposition, all of which ought to be taken into consideration at 
the design stage: reciprocal adaptation, bias towards isolated use, culture-specific behaviour, and inability to 
manually configure the system. By considering these issues, our purpose is to raise awareness of the ethical 
problems that can arise because of intelligent user interfaces that rely on natural, overt behaviour. 
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Ambient Intelligence is a vision in which computers 
play an increasingly pervasive yet unobtrusive part 
of our everyday lives. Whereas some hold that 
increased ubiquity alone will constitute a revolution 
in computing, others hold that it is not really a 
paradigmatic shift from more traditional forms of 
computing. In the words of pioneer Mark Weiser, 
―ubiquitous computing will produce nothing funda-
mentally new, but [make] everything faster and 
easier to do, with less strain and fewer mental 
gymnastics‖ (Weiser 1991:104). Although it is 
debatable whether ubiquitous computing introduces 
anything fundamentally new, it might come to 
exacerbate many of the ethical problems that arise 
as a result of our increasing dependence on com-
puter technology. These problems include oft-
debated issues such as invasion of privacy, identity 
theft, reduced autonomy and values-in-design.1 
Even if ubiquitous computing does not pose any 
unique problems, this is not a reason to ignore the 
phenomenon. To paraphrase Friedrich Engel‘s laws 
of dialectics, quantitative changes sometimes lead to 
qualitative changes. Our concern in this paper, 
however, is to argue that Ambient Intelligence, in 
virtue of adding Intelligent User Interfaces to ubiqui-
tous computing, does introduce novel features that 
deserve special attention. Specifically, we will argue 
that AmI presupposes a behaviourist conception of 
the relation between human desires and behaviour. 
Insofar as we interact with AmI devices through 
natural, overt behaviour, we need to pay special 
attention to what kinds of behaviour these devices 
require, what kinds of desire-behaviour relations 
that are presupposed, and to what degree the 
required behaviour might be reinforced. Thus, rather 
than framing our discussion in terms of privacy, 
autonomy, risk or similar notions, we will focus on 
the functions and capabilities of Intelligent User 
Interfaces, in particular what kinds of behaviour 
they require and might come to foster. In doing so, 
we will propose and consider four distinct issues 
that signify when designers and engineers ought to 
pay special attention to the ethical and social impact 
of the behavioural requirements. 
                                               
1 See Brey (2006) and Tavani (2007:355-361) for an 
overview of some of the ethical issues that arise in 
connection with the Ambient Intelligence para-
digm. 
What is Ambient Intelligence? 
Ambient Intelligence (AmI) is an approach that 
combines two major technologies: Ubiquitous Com-
puting and Intelligent User Interfaces (IUI). In 
Ubiquitous Computing, computers do not appear as 
distinct objects, but are embedded into everyday 
working and living environments in an invisible and 
unobtrusive way. They make information, media and 
network access constantly and transparently avail-
able.2 To the Ubiquitous Computing approach, AmI 
adds the technology of Intelligent User Interfaces. 
These interfaces, which are based on human–
computer interaction research, go beyond traditional 
interfaces like the keyboard, mouse and monitor. 
They aim to make information technology easier to 
use by making interactions with it more intuitive, 
efficient, and secure; by ―dissolving design in behav-
iour‖ (Greenfield 2006:26). As such, they are de-
signed to allow the computer to know a lot more 
about users and the user environment than tradi-
tional interfaces can. Intelligent User Interfaces 
have two key features: profiling and context aware-
ness. Profiling is the ability to personalize and auto-
matically adapt to particular user behaviour pat-
terns. Context awareness is the ability to adapt to 
different situations. Profiling and context awareness 
depend on sensors to record aspects of the envi-
ronment and of user behaviour, and intelligent 
algorithms to make inferences about situations and 
users. IUIs are capable of creating a perceptive and 
proactive computer environment, rather than a 
passive one that relies on active and comprehensive 
user input. 
One of the most interesting and novel aspects of 
Ambient Intelligence is the way human-computer 
interaction is redefined. The user interfaces of AmI 
seek to radically change the way we interact with 
computer technology – primarily by means of letting 
the computer infer our desires on the basis of overt 
and natural behaviour. The traditional way of issuing 
commands to a computer is by means of specially 
adapted peripherals such as mouse, keyboard or 
joystick. These traditional interfaces are limited in 
the sense that they require what we could refer to 
as ―digital‖ behaviour – that is, discrete, non-natural 
actions that can easily be converted to digital input. 
                                               
2 Tavani (2007:356) makes a helpful distinction 
between pervasive computing and ubiquitous 
communication, but for the purposes of this paper 
we have subsumed these under the heading 
‗ubiquitous computing‘. 
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Consequently, our behaviour in front of the com-
puter is usually different from our behaviour away 
from the computer, which also means that we can 
easily distinguish between human-computer interac-
tions and other actions.3 If we go beyond the tradi-
tional human-computer interfaces, there are primar-
ily three different ways in which more natural, less 
discrete behaviour can be used to control com-
puters. We will refer to these as different behaviour-
desire relations – that is, different ways of inferring 
our desires (what we want the computer to do) on 
the basis of our behaviour:4 
Pre-configured behaviour-desire relations: 
The device can be manufactured in such a way that 
specific non-peripheral behaviour leads to the de-
sired results. One simple example is the infamous 
―Clapper‖ technology, which allows the user to turn 
the lights on and off by means of clapping in a 
determinate way. 
User-configured behaviour-desire relations: 
The device can be manufactured in such a way that 
the users themselves can configure it to respond to 
specific behaviour. For instance, many mobile 
phones allow the user to record voice commands 
that correspond to specific functions. 
User-adaptive behaviour-desire relations:  
More advanced forms of user interfaces, and one of 
the cornerstones of Ambient Intelligence, is to let 
the device observe your natural behaviour and infer 
how your behaviour relates to your desires. For 
instance, Mark Weiser gives an example of an IUI in 
your bedroom that interprets restless rolling in the 
morning as an (imminent) desire for coffee (Weiser 
1991:101). 
One device can of course employ more than one of 
these interfaces, but the most interesting and 
unique challenges, and advantages, of Ambient 
Intelligence stem from user-adaptive systems. 
Having a computer system adapt to our behaviour 
                                               
3 To put it bluntly, when away from the computer 
we do not press our left finger twice when we 
open a document or tap our fingers on plastic 
keys when we communicate. 
4 One could add highly advanced brain-computer 
interfaces to this list, which raises even more pro-
found questions with regard to the relation be-
tween our desires and observable brain signals. 
We are still far away from seeing these kinds of 
technologies in widespread use, however. 
means that we do not have to configure it our-
selves, which ensures that the technology disap-
pears in the background. In order to become a 
transparent, unobtrusive technology that will effort-
lessly blend into our everyday lives, Ambient Intelli-
gence depends on the successful implementation of 
user-adaptive interfaces. This is also where the 
unique challenges posed by Ambient Intelligence 
begin. 
Problems with inferring desires 
from behaviour 
Ambient Intelligence differs from traditional IT in the 
sense that we no longer consider what our desires 
are and interact with the device (behave) accord-
ingly. Instead, we leave it up to the device itself to 
infer ―what we really want‖ on the basis of our 
natural behaviour. In order for AmI to function 
optimally, it must therefore be possible to reliably 
infer certain human desires by way of observing 
behaviour alone. As such, AmI presupposes that 
behaviourist accounts of human behaviour are valid, 
at least for the application domain in question. This 
raises one of the most discussed issues in philoso-
phy of mind and psychology: can desires be reliably 
inferred on the basis of behaviour alone? The near-
consensus in psychology and in philosophy of mind 
is that this is not the case (see e.g. Fodor 1975; 
Searle 2001). The common view is that it is not 
single beliefs or desires that can be correlated with 
particular behaviours, but only complex webs of 
mental states. If I want coffee, for example, I may 
take the coffee in front of me, but only if I believe 
that the black liquid in the cup is coffee, I do not 
believe that the coffee is poisoned, and I do not fear 
that it is so hot I will burn myself, etcetera. Con-
versely, my coffee-taking behaviour may be caused 
by a desire for coffee, but also by a desire for the 
cup itself, a fear that a nearby child will spill the 
coffee over itself, or a belief that the cup contains 
tea, which I happen to desire. In spite of these 
kinds of problems, fully developed IUIs seem to 
presuppose a classical behaviourist account of the 
behaviour-desire relation in which desires can be 
reliably inferred from behaviour. This behaviourist 
underpinning gives rise to four challenges.5 
                                               
5 Some of these challenges can be described as 
constraints on our autonomy. For a discussion in 
these terms, see Brey (2006). 
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Reciprocal adaptation 
In a perfect world, we could envision intelligent user 
interfaces that reliably and accurately infer our 
desires from our behaviour, but this is not the case, 
neither when humans nor computers try to do so. 
To use a common example, a desire to escape pain 
does not necessarily lead to pain-aversive behav-
iour, and pain-aversive behaviour does not neces-
sarily signify a desire to escape pain. As a result of 
this basic problem with behaviourism, successful 
interaction between humans and user-adaptive 
systems requires some adaptation on the human‘s 
part as well; we need to act in such a way that our 
desire becomes evident and predictable. In many 
ways, making a computer system adapt to your 
desires is similar to making a pet adapt to your 
desires. In order to properly train and command a 
pet animal, your behaviour must be discrete, pre-
dictable and overt, as opposed to vague, random 
and subtle. Since the artificial intelligence that 
underpins these user interfaces is unlikely to exceed 
the intelligence of most pet animals, we must adapt 
our behaviour in a similar fashion in our interactions 
with user-adaptive systems. Consequently, AmI is 
likely to make us change our natural behaviour to 
accommodate its limitations. 
In this connection, it is also interesting to note that 
behaviourism is not only a theory of how to explain 
human behaviour. Although behaviourism has been 
largely discredited as an explanatory framework, its 
continued influence in psychology primarily stems 
from its ability to prescribe and predict how behav-
iour can change as a result of conditioning. Through 
concepts like positive and negative reinforcement, 
avoidance learning and habituation, behaviourism 
yields insight into how certain stimuli can lead to 
dramatic changes in our behaviour. Thus, if a user-
adaptive system yields some kind of visual, auditory 
or tactile stimulus apt for conditioning, our behav-
ioural adaptation to the system could become more 
entrenched, instinctive and even transferred to 
situations where we do not interact with the system 
at all. If behaviourism is correct in assuming that 
these mechanisms are particularly powerful with 
children, we should be especially aware of AmI 
devices that can reinforce behaviour in children. 
In other words, not only the computer system will 
come to adapt its ―behaviour‖ according to ours, it is 
also likely that we come to change our behaviour in 
order to effectively make the user-adaptive system 
comply with our desires. It should be noted that this 
is a problem with many other technologies as well. 
For instance, in order to watch TV, the user needs 
to be located relatively still in front of the television 
set. As a consequence, TV does not only require 
immobility but the more it becomes a part of our 
lives the more it comes to foster that behaviour – 
what is sometimes referred to as the couch potato 
syndrome. If we add the hypothesis that couch 
potato behaviour is responsible for an alarming 
increase in obesity in many countries, then it be-
comes clear that behaviour fostered by technology 
can have profound implications. Although these 
kinds of affordances can be found in many tech-
nologies, AmI not only implicitly, but explicitly 
requires particular forms of behaviour. This is the 
reason why the behaviourist presuppositions of AmI 
deserve special attention. With a technology that is 
both designed to become a part of our everyday life 
and that explicitly requires certain forms of behav-
iour, we should be particularly aware of what kinds 
of behaviour such systems require and therefore 
might come to foster.  
Bias towards isolated use 
One design problem with AmI devices is that user-
adaptation sometimes becomes difficult when multi-
ple users interact with the same device. For in-
stance, when your AmI-enabled TV has perfectly 
adapted to your desires and can anticipate your 
preferences after having observed your behaviour 
for a long time, you run the risk of loosing that 
adaptation if someone else starts using it. Thus, the 
optimal adaptation of AmI devices often requires 
interaction with only one person, which in turn 
means that each user needs an individually tailored 
device. If we return to the previous analogy, a 
television set fosters sitting still in front of it, but it 
does not discriminate between watching it alone or 
together with other people. An AmI-enabled TV, on 
the other hand, might foster sitting still in front of it 
alone.6 It should be noted that this is not a general 
feature of all AmI devices. Compromises can often 
be found when the device manipulates variables 
that form a continuum, as in temperature regula-
                                               
6 Such individualized profiling also raises many of 
the same issues that Cass Sunstein has raised 
with regard to profiling on the Internet. According 
to Sunstein, social interaction and external delib-
eration is related to having had mutual experi-
ences that can be the source of discussions in 
public fora and ―around the water cooler‖. These 
mutual experiences, Sunstein claims, would be 
diminished if we all have individually tailored 
sources of information (Sunstein 2001). 
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tion, or when one device allows for multiple profiles. 
However, if an AmI device works best when used in 
isolation, it is likely to foster use in isolation as well. 
A similar worry is expressed in the recommendations 
of the Information Society and Technology Advisory 
Group (ISTAG). ISTAG stress that AmI should 
facilitate community building and provide ―flexible 
participation in … family/social interactions‖ (ISTAG 
2003:10). For some AmI devices, the behavioural 
requirements will make it difficult to live up to this 
standard.  
Cultural differences in behaviour 
The most advanced AmI research and development 
centres are spread across the world, and we are 
likely to see AmI devices from both Western and 
East Asian countries. In order for AmI to function 
optimally, it is important that the behavioural input 
is natural and highly indicative of the underlying 
desire. However, what is seen as natural behaviour 
and how certain forms of behaviour relate to under-
lying desires depends to some degree on our cul-
tural background. Behavioural indicators such as the 
range and importance of gesticulation, facial expres-
sions and body language can differ radically from 
one culture to another. Problems regarding culture-
specific forms of human-computer interaction is 
already an important issue in computer ethics (cf. 
Ess 2002), and these problems are likely to become 
more pressing as our interactions become more 
pervasive, ubiquitous and requiring reciprocal adap-
tation. For instance, some AmI-devices might dis-
criminate against certain culture-specific forms of 
behaviour. Returning to reciprocal adaptation, 
globalization researchers have expressed concern 
over homogenization of cultural expressions as a 
result of technology being transported from one 
culture to another. AmI devices that require users to 
adapt to culture-specific forms of behaviour is one 
way in which such homogenization might occur.  
Inability to configure manually 
A common response to many objections raised 
against AmI is to simply include the possibility to 
override the user-adaptations and reset or configure 
the system manually if it misbehaves. This is some-
what question-begging, since the purpose of AmI is 
to make our interactions transparent and seamless, 
which is undermined if we constantly have to manu-
ally reconfigure the device in question. More to the 
point, given that many people are unable or unwill-
ing to configure devices such as video recorders or 
mobile phones, it is a legitimate concern that many 
will simply go along with whatever behaviour the 
AmI device requires. If we are dealing with AmI that 
targets multiple users, the ability to adjust the 
system individually could also mean that savvy users 
will have more influence on the system than others. 
In other words, a digital divide could arise between 
those who simply adapt to the required behaviour 
and those who are savvy enough to configure it 
manually.7  
Concluding remarks 
The purpose of this paper has not been to show that 
Ambient Intelligence necessarily leads to unwanted 
behaviour, nor that the fostering of certain kinds of 
behaviour is necessarily wrong.8 Rather, the purpose 
has been to show that insofar as an AmI device 
infers our desires based on natural, overt behaviour, 
designers and engineers need to pay special atten-
tion to what kinds of behaviour it requires – and to 
what extent it can reinforce this behaviour. This is 
especially the case if it 1) requires reciprocal adapta-
tion, 2) has a bias towards isolated use, 3) requires 
culture-specific behaviour, or 4) cannot easily be 
configured or reset manually. These considerations 
become especially important when dealing with AmI 
devices targeted at children, given that they are 
more susceptible to reinforcement. If these and 
similar considerations are taken seriously at the 
design stage, we could avoid many of the societal 
and ethical implications that can arise from Ambient 
Intelligence. 
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